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I. INTRODUCTION
The third quarter of the nineteenth century was the golden age of economic and
political liberalism and the entrepreneur. 1 The last quarter of the nineteenth century and
the first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed the decline of political and
economic liberalism, the demise of the entrepreneur in favor of the modem corporation,
and the rise of competing systems built on ideologies 2 either partially or completely at
odds with a pure free market economy. 3 The First World War marked the breakdown of
* M.E. Kilpatrick Chair, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. See ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL, 1848-1875 1-4, 29-68 (Vintage Books 1996) (1975).
2. "Ideologies are, by definition, attempts to say that what is contingent and constructed by the
participants in the society, the grandest of all hermeneutic circles, is in fact natural, a part of the nature the mind
is supposed to be able to mirror, and thus to legitimate the power that ideology bestows on selected
individuals." John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REv. 435, 449 (1989)
(book review).
3. See ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 1875-1914 (Vintage Books 1989) (1987). "One way or
another, after 1875, there was growing skepticism about the effectiveness of the autonomous and self-correcting
market economy, Adam Smith's famous 'hidden hand,' without some assistance from state and public
authority. The hand was becoming visible in all sorts of ways." Id. at 54; HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL,
supra note 1, at 155-69.
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nineteenth century western civilization. 4 The Great Depression confirmed that economic
liberalism and free market capitalism had failed. 5 Whether collectivism, fascism, or some
form of heavily-government-regulated capitalism would become the world's dominant
political and economic philosophy was a question slowly and painfully answered and re-
answered thereafter. 6
In America, however, the answer seemed clear early on. Classic liberalism 7 and the
ideology of free markets and the individual entrepreneur gave way to the New Deal 8 and
a philosophy that strongly preferred government regulation to promote the general
welfare over protection of private property rights in the means of production. 9 The New
Deal ideology reflected widespread fear and distrust of the modem corporation and its
economic and political power. 10 In corporation law, the governing ideology concerning
the corporation crystallized in the Berle-Means Paradigm and its identification of
separation of ownership and control as the central problem of the modem corporation. " I
For nearly fifty years thereafter, this description of the corporation provided the
theoretical framework for mainstream corporatibn law scholarship 12-a paradigm far
more powerful than simple fear of the modem corporation and its entrenched,
unrestrained managers.
Around 1980, the governing-ideology pendulum unexpectedly swung the other way.
Advocates of free markets, individualism, and elimination of government regulation
recaptured political and intellectual control in America, England, and, within a decade,
most of the first-world countries.13 Within corporation law, a similar ideological shift
As capitalism and bourgeois society triumphed, the prospects of alternatives to it receded, in spite
of the emergence of popular politics and labor movements. These prospects could hardly have
seemed less promising in, say 1872-3. And yet within a very few years the future of the society
that had triumphed so spectacularly once again seemed uncertain and obscure, and movements to
replace it or overthrow it had once again to be taken seriously.
Id.
4. ERIc HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 6 (Pantheon Books 1995) (1994). Hobsbawm describes that
civilization and its liberal nature: "This civilization was capitalist in its economy; liberal in its legal and
constitutional structure; bourgeois in the image of its characteristic hegemonic class; glorying in the advance of
science, knowledge and education, material and moral progress . I.." d.
5. Id. at 102-08.
6. Id. at 6-17.
7. Id. at 54-499.
8. Id. at 105.
9.
The New Dealers answered the old Constitution's account of economic liberty with a new one.
They held that all Americans had rights to decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a
measure of economic democracy, including rights on the part of wage-earning Americans to
organize and bargain collectively with employers.
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 166 (2001).
10. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal
Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 185-96 (2005).
11. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 739-
40, 753-59 (2001).
12. Id. at 737.
13. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES, supra note 4, at 403-18.
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occurred. 14 Disciples of the Chicago School of Law and Economics controlled the
agenda. Their swift rise to dominance coincided with the ascendancy in corporation law
of a new hegemonic paradigm, founded on the view that the corporation is a nexus-of-
contracts-a consensual ordering of relations generally to be governed by private
ordering and not government regulation. 15
This most recent era of free market ideological dominance has seen a rekindling of
the cult of the entrepreneur primarily in the form of the modem CEO. 16 One example of
the exalted status that the modem CEO has enjoyed post-1980 should suffice:
The average CEO made $6.7 million more in 2003 than in 1980, when they
made $1.4 million, adjusted for inflation. The average full-time production and
non-supervisory worker made $31,928 in 2003 and $31,769 in 1980, adjusted
for inflation-a gain of $159. CEOs often spend more than that on dinner.
CEO pay skyrocketed 480% during 1980-2003, adjusted for inflation, while
domestic corporate profits rose 145%, worker productivity rose 61% and
worker pay stalled. If CEO and worker pay had increased at the pace of worker
productivity, CEOs would have made $2.3 million in 2003 and workers
$51,148.17
However, the reign of the CEO, the modem personification of the swashbuckling
entrepreneur of the 19th century, has not been reflected in corporation law's version of
free market ideology-the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation. For the last two
decades of the twentieth century, nexus-of-contracts scholars overwhelmingly agreed that
corporation law can best be understood by reference to shareholder primacy-the
predictive (and normative) maxim that the defining purpose of corporation law is
shareholder wealth maximization. 18 Recently, there have been two provocative,
14. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471, 1476-77 (1989).
15. See Steven M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 858 (1997) (discussing the nexus-of-
contracts theory of the firm). The law and economics movement remains the most successful example of
intellectual arbitrage in the history of corporate jurisprudence. It is virtually impossible to find serious corporate
law scholarship that is not informed by economic analysis. Even those corporate law scholars who reject
economic analysis spend most of their time responding to those of us who practice it.
16. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture, and Convergence: Corporations American
Style or With a European Touch?, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 33, 56 (2003).
[Tihe position [of] the CEO in the modem American corporation is like that of a third-world
autocrat. Indeed, like political systems dominated by the "cult of the leadership personality," it is
not unfair to say that most American corporations manifest "a cult of the CEO." It is almost an
article of faith of American business that the CEO, and the CEO alone, is responsible for the rise
or fall of the corporation's fortunes. Popular and managerial opinion in the United States considers
that Lou Gerstner single handedly turned around IBM, that Jack Welch built GE into a modem
force all by himself, and that Sandy Weill alone created Citigroup. CEOs not only manage. They
write books. They appear regularly on television. They are the superstars of American corporate
culture.
Id.
17. Holly Sklar, Outsource CEOs, not Workers, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER, Apr. 30, 2004,
http://www.commondreams.org/viewsO4/0430-06.htm.
18. The dominant view at the turn of the century was aptly summarized by Henry Hansmann & Reinier
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alternative accounts of corporation law, each of which touts a version of director
primacy-the maxim that the defining purpose of corporation law is to promote
centralized decision-making within the corporation. 19 However, neither of these models
is completely satisfactory because they predict shareholder or director primacy in
important circumstances where, in fact, the law favors the CEO. 20 My intuition, which I
am testing here and elsewhere, is that these anomalies are explained by what I call the
theory of entrepreneur primacy-the proposition that corporation law may be understood
as a mechanism to support private ordering intended to provide the modem corporation
with a surrogate for the classic entrepreneur-the entrepreneur exalted in free market
ideology as it existed immediately prior to the Great Depression.
The foremost description of the classic entrepreneur, immediately prior to the Great
Depression and now, was presented by Frank Knight in his seminal work, Risk,
Uncertainty, and Profit.2 1 In this Article, I will explicate Knight's theory of the
entrepreneur and show how it relates to both the Berle-Means Paradigm and the nexus-
of-contracts theory of the corporation. My effort here is in part intellectual history and in
part the tentative beginnings of a new positive account of the corporation. In the latter
regard, this Article takes only the first step in what may prove a quite exhaustive effort to
re-plow the field of corporation law.
Part II describes capitalist ideology, and the central place therein of the entrepreneur,
as it was understood at the nascence of the New Deal. Part III examines the Berle-Means
view of the modem corporation, how that view depended on, and was fueled by, the
"death" of the classical entrepreneur, and how the study of corporation law thereafter
focused on the problems presented by separation of ownership and control. As Part III
notes, economists working in the tradition of Adam Smith (unlike corporation law
scholars) continued to give the entrepreneur a central place in their study and defense of
capitalism long after the birth of the New Deal. Part IV examines the development of the
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001).
The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is
now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago .... The standard
model has never been questioned for the vast majority of corporations. It dominates the law and
governance of closely held corporations in every jurisdiction . . . . [T]he standard model of
shareholder primacy has always been the dominant legal model in the two jurisdictions where the
choice of models might be expected to matter most: the U.S. and the U.K.
Id.
19. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue that corporate power is lodged in the board of directors so that it
may serve as a mediating hierarchy, refereeing the competing claims of shareholders and other corporate
constituencies involved in the team production of the corporation's product. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout,
Team Production Theory]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations:
An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production]; Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403
(2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Director Accountability]. Stephen Bainbridge asserts that directors are the
locus of all corporate power, controlled only by the principle that the proper end to which their decision should
aim is shareholder wealth maximization. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, 88 IOwA L. REv. 1 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (2003).
20. See infra Part VI.
21. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Midway Reprint ed. 1985) (1921).
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Nexus-of-Contracts theory of the corporation, and how one of its central assumptions-
the study of the classical entrepreneur-is irrelevant and misleading if one hopes to
understand the modem corporation. Part IV then describes my counterview: corporation
law can be understood, at least in important part, as intended to ensure that the modem
corporation has an effective surrogate for the classical entrepreneur. Part V revisits the
work of Frank Knight to develop an understanding of the central characteristics of the
classic entrepreneur, and why it is reasonable to assert that the modem corporation
generally does have an adequate surrogate for the classic entrepreneur. Part VI tests the
predictive power of entrepreneur primacy in comparison to the predictive power of two
versions of director primacy. The Article concludes with a brief look ahead.
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR IN
TRADITIONAL "FREE MARKET" IDEOLOGY
Beginning in 1776 with the publication of The Wealth of Nations22 and continuing
for nearly 200 years, classical and then neo-classical economic theorists elaborated on the
work of Adam Smith to provide theoretical justification for a political and economic
system supportive of the individual entrepreneur's wealth and power, a system featuring
strong legal protection of the entrepreneur's right to own and control his business assets
and strict limits on the power of government to regulate or control economic activity. 23
One product of this effort-the perfect competition model 24 -shows how, in a perfectly
competitive free market economy, the maximizing behavior of individual producers and
consumers, guided solely by price signals, would result in the best possible allocation of
economic resources. 2 5
The "black box" that is the firm in perfect competition theory may represent a solo
producer, 26 but it does not betoken an entrepreneur. Perfect competition theory assumes
omniscient actors-everyone in the market knows everything about prices, demand, and
product quality. There is no role for an entrepreneur. Each individual involved in the
perfect market is effectively an automaton. 27 When we move to the real, imperfect world,
free market ideology viewed the individual entrepreneur-the sole proprietor who owned
and managed her own firm-as the primary motor driving the economy from the
producer side of the equation. In turn, private property in the means of production was
justified as central to a system depending on the voluntary actions of each market
participant. Private property in the means of production allows and creates incentives for
the entrepreneur to use her talents and capital in an effort to maximize her own wealth
22. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 421-24 (Random House 1937) (1776).
23. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 159-60 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
24. Id. at 160 (stating that "[t]he intellectual achievement of-this model is its complete abstraction from
centralized control of the economy. What is modeled is not competition but extreme decentralization").
25. Under perfect competition, "each individual achieves the goal of rational action, maximizing the want
satisfaction procurable with his given resources (whatever they are) in purchasing power, by distributing them
among the alternatives according to the law of choice." KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 85. This is the best possible
allocation of resources achievable by voluntary consent because at equilibrium "no individual will wish to
exchange anything in his possession for anything in the possession of any one else." Id.
26. A producer who has no employees.
27. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 268.
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and happiness. The entrepreneur's selfish use of her property-her effort to make a profit
and accumulate wealth-results in the best possible allocation of resources and the
maximization of all citizens' wealth and happiness. Berle and Means called this the
traditional logic of profits.
By carrying on enterprise [the entrepreneur] would employ his energy
and wealth in such a way as to obtain more wealth. In this effort he
would tend to make for profit those things which were in most demand.
Competition among countless producers could be relied upon in general
to maintain profits within reasonable limits while temporary excessive
profits in any one line of production would induce an increase of
activity in that line with a consequent drop of profits to more
reasonable levels. At the same time it was supposed that the business
man's effort to increase his profits, would, in general, result in more
economical use of the means of production, each enterprise having to
compete with others for the available economic resources. Therefore, it
has been argued that by protecting each man in the possession of any
profits he could make from its use, society would encourage enterprise
and thereby facilitate the production and distribution of goods desired
by a community at reasonable prices with the economic use of labor,
capital, and business enterprise. 28
As Frank Knight put it, the entrepreneurs are "the individuals with superior
managerial ability (foresight and capacity of ruling others) . . ." who, because they have
"confidence in their [own] judgment.. . 'back it up"' by guaranteeing the wages of their
employees and putting their own capital at ultimate risk.29 It is the entrepreneur who
carries out two key functions: she manages-that is, she determines what to do and how
to do it-and she assumes the risk of her decisions-that is, she puts her personal wealth
at risk as a means of guaranteeing to her employees that even if the venture fails, they
will receive the compensation for which they bargained. 30 This unification of ownership
is the defining characteristic of the classic entrepreneur and is essential to the proper
working of the free market system.31
III. THE ENTREPRENEUR AND THE MODERN CORPORATION; LAW AND ECONOMICS
DIVERGE
Frank Knight's prototypical entrepreneur, the "responsible" manager who owns and
controls her business, 32 was fundamental to free market ideology. For most of the latter
28. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 340-41 (The MacMillan Company 1933) (1932).
29. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 270.
30. Id. at 269-76. Though not often acknowledged, Knight's theory of the entrepreneur recognized the
essential elements of what Alchian and Demsetz later described as the metering problem endemic to team
production. Compare id. at 275-76, with Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778-81 (1972).
31. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 308.
32. Id.at271.
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half of the nineteenth century, the real-world economy was reasonably congruent with
this theoretical imperative. 33 Sole proprietors dominated American industry. 34 By 1930,
ownership of American industry was fundamentally transformed-the ownership of a
large and ever growing share of American industry and the means of industrial
production had passed from the classical sole proprietor to the large publicly-traded
corporation. 3
5
This shift from widely dispersed ownership of industrial wealth to a large-
corporation dominated economy was not discovered by Berle and Means. It did not
happen overnight, and did not go unobserved by others. 36 As will be discussed fully
below, 37 it was well understood by Frank Knight, who argued that the apparent
separation of control observed in the modem corporation was illusory. Nor did Berle and
Means first argue that the ascendancy of the publicly-traded corporation posed challenges
to the relevancy of free market ideology. 38 Well before the Great Depression, a growing
number of intellectuals and policy makers believed that "an economy increasingly
dominated by huge corporations made nonsense of the term 'perfect competition.' 39
"One did not have to be a Marxist, or show an interest in Marx, to observe how unlike the
economy of nineteenth century free competition ... capitalism [of that period] was."' 4 0
What Berle and Means did do was identify the extent to which the publicly-traded
corporation had achieved hegemony, document the extent to which share ownership and
management power were already held in separate hands, and accurately predict that this
concentration of ownership would steadily envelope a greater share of industrial property
and wealth. 4 1 They also provided the intellectual framework--often called the Berle-
Means Paradigm-that would dominate corporation law scholarship for nearly fifty
years. 42
It is at this point that corporation law ideology and the microeconomic study of
markets and firms diverge. Economists working in the microeconomic tradition extant
prior to the Great Depression continued to study the classic entrepreneur to gain insights
into the workings of the modem corporation. 43 Law and public policy makers seeking to
reform the modem corporation trod in the footsteps of Berle and Means, believing the
33. See HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 214.
34. There were also corporations and partnerships, of course, but most of them were closely-held so that
the separation of ownership and control was relatively insignificant. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28, at 4,
334.
35. By 1930, as Berle and Means documented, corporations controlled 78% of America's business wealth,
and the 200 largest companies controlled 38% of America's business wealth. Id. at 31. The 200 largest
companies were growing at more than twice the rate of all other non-financial corporations. See id. at 40. As a
result, power over the American economy was increasingly in the hands of a relatively small number of very
large corporations. Id. at 44.
36. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES, supra note 4, at 103.
37. See infra Part V.
38. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 10, 45.
39. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES, supra note 4, at 103.
40. Id.
41. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at
xxix-xxx, 317-59 (rev. ed., Harcourt 1967) (1932).
42. William W. Bratton, Berle And Means Reconsidered At The Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 737
(2001).
43. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289-90 (1980).
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classic entrepreneur of little relevance.
I will defer until Part V, a detailed consideration of the views of Frank Knight and
the relevance of those views to a better current understanding of corporation law. It is
enough at this point to note that as early as 1916, 44 Frank Knight understood that "[tlhe
typical form of business unit in the modem world is the corporation. Its most important
characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated control."
45
Knight argued that the separation of ownership and control in the modem corporation did
not mean that responsibility had been wholly separated from control. Careful study would
reveal, he asserted, that a reasonable approximation of the classical entrepreneur will be
found in control of the typical modem corporation.
46
Knight's view did not predominate, even within the field of microeconomics, where
study of the entrepreneur remained relevant, not because it was deficient as a theoretical
construct, but because it was not consonant with how the vast majority of citizens and
policymakers perceived "the facts on the ground." The ascendancy of the large
corporation, the horror of the First World War (coming after nearly a century free from
widespread warfare), and the communist revolution in Russia, all played a role in shaping
popular sentiment. 47 The Great Depression then "confirmed intellectuals, activists and
ordinary citizens in the belief that something was fundamentally wrong with the world
they lived in." 48
Berle and Means asserted that the corporation, as used to organize relations within
large publicly-traded firms, was a totally new form of property whose characteristics
threatened the legitimacy of the free enterprise system of economic organization. 49 It had
long been possible for an individual entrepreneur "to incorporate his business even
though it still represents his own investment, his own activities, and his own business
transactions; he has in fact merely created a legal alter ego by setting up a corporation as
the nominal vehicle." 50
The use of the corporation to own and operate large, publicly-traded firms created
a fundamentally different entity--"the quasi-public corporation . . . in which a large
measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the
multiplication of owners." 5 1 In the quasi-public corporation, management exercises
control, while the passive, geographically dispersed shareholders who make up the
investing public are powerless. 52 "No longer are the individuals in control of most of the
companies the dominant owners. Rather, there are no dominant owners, and control is
44. Though not published until 1921, "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit was Knight's doctoral thesis,
completed in 1916." George Stigler, Foreword to FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at ix
(Midway Reprint ed. 1985).
45. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 291.
46. Id. at 291-312.
47. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES, supra note 4, at 6-8, 54-58, 73-74.
48. Id. at 102.
49. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28, at 7-9.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5. Berle and Means found that in more than half of the 200 largest publicly-traded corporations,
management's stock ownership constituted such a small percentage of the voting stock as to be irrelevant in the
election of directors. Id. at 94, 114, 117.
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maintained largely apart from ownership." 53
In Berle's and Means's view, the quasi-public corporation, with its separation of
ownership and control, threatened the theoretical underpinnings of the free enterprise
system.
It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to use
his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire
for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his
efficient use of any industrial property he may possess.
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds. As we
have seen, it is no longer the individual, himself, who uses his wealth. Those in
control of that wealth, and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency
and produce profits, are no longer as owners entitled to the bulk of such profits
... . The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old
assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property
to its effective use. 54
Berle and Means asserted that the quasi-public corporation, and the corporate system
of which it was a part, were new institutions that compete with and threaten to supplant
the modem state as the dominant form of social organization because "[they] involve[] a
concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of
economic power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the modem state." 55
Significantly, Berle and Means concluded that the corporation should now be analyzed as
a social organization, and with a view to determining how managers' power shall be
constrained for the public good. 56
Berle and Means categorized three types of possible responses to the economic
power of the quasi-public corporation and its managers. Society could seek to bend the
quasi-public corporation and their managers to the will of the shareholders, recreating the
traditional understanding of property. Alternatively, society could recognize that
corporate managers have absolute power, constrained only by their sense of morality and
public duty. A third possibility would be to treat the interests of both managers and
shareholders as subordinate to the paramount claims of the community, leading to the
evolution of managers who are "a purely neutral technocracy." 57
From the New Deal onwards, law and policy makers chose to pursue the third
approach-subordinating private property in the means of production to the legitimate
claims of the larger society. 58 The institution of private property that had given the
53. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28, at 117.
54. Id. at 8-9.
55. Id. at 352.
56. Id. at 353-57.
57. Id. at 356.
58. In one of its most criticized decisions, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the
[Supreme] Court embraced substantive due process and constitutionalized private property
and freedom of contract. The Lochner doctrine enshrined laissez-faire, and for approximately
thirty years led the Court to strike down state economic and social laws, such as minimum
wage maximum hours laws, designed to promote the general welfare and which were often
supported by sizeable democratic majorities . . . . [Tihe Lochner doctrine was repudiated
2006]
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entrepreneur almost total control over his business-the right to hire and fire whomever
he wanted for whatever reason, the right to set wages and working conditions, the right to
pollute air and water rather than incur costs for less environmentally harmful methods of
production-would yield to competing interests within the larger society. 59
Over the years, corporation law scholars writing within the Berle-Means Paradigm
offered numerous proposals for corporation law reform designed to better achieve certain
of these larger social goals. 60 However, to the extent this so-called "corporate social
responsibility" scholarship sought to use corporation law to further regulate corporations,
it did not bear fruit: lawmakers would in every significant case choose to achieve these
larger social goals through legal institutions, both statutory and regulatory, other than
state or federal corporation law. 6 1
The role of corporation law would have been much greater during this period if law
and policy makers also had decided to pursue the first possibility for regulating the
corporation noted by Berle and Means-bending the corporation to the will of the
shareholders so as to reunite ownership and control. However, instead of choosing to
make shareholders "real owners" and suitable surrogates for the classical entrepreneur,
law and policy makers chose to view shareholders as holders of a new type of property
that did not provide them with the legal rights that the classic entrepreneur enjoyed.
Shareholders as a class were treated as having chosen to provide capital to the
corporation knowing that the law requires shareholders to submit to the managers'
judgment as to what is in the best interest of the corporation, including whether and in
what amount to pay a dividend. 62
The only significant role left for state corporation law was providing the institution
of fiduciary duty, mainly to check unfair self-dealing or other insider use of corporation
funds that could not possibly be justified as in the best interest of the shareholders or the
corporation. 63 Federal corporation law was never allowed to develop. 64 Erie v.
during the New Deal.
Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1307,
1340 (2001).
59. The New Deal always recognized that a more equitable distribution of income and opportunities, not
to be confused with socialism or a drab egalitarianism which militates against incentives, is indispensable to the
improved functioning of the entire economy. Many New Deal programs and policies were directed toward, and
substantially accomplished, improved distribution of income and opportunity. These included spending and tax
policies in general, the early public employment and relief acts, the wage and working condition provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act (N.I.R.A.), and minimum wage legislation. Other measures include the
huge reduction in interest rates and the cost of credit, the early housing reforms, the farm price supports, the
original Social Security Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, labor legislation protecting collective
bargaining including section 7(a) of the N.I.R.A. and the Wagner Act, and the early banking and security
exchange reforms. See Leon H. Keyserling, The New Deal and Its Current Significance In Re National
Economic and Social Policy, 59 WASH. L. REV. 795, 801 (1984).
60. For a concise summary of the history of corporate social responsibility scholarship, see C.A. Harwell
Wells, The Cycles Of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective For The Twenty-First
Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 77 (2002).
61. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End Of History For Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
440-41 (2001).
62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28, at 277.
63. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1661-63 (2001).
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Tompkins 65 killed the federal common law of corporations that federal courts had been
developing in a straightforward manner. 66 The Burger Court killed the lower federal
courts' later effort to create a federal common law of corporations through the backdoor
of Rule 10b-5. 67 As the era of the Berle-Means Paradigm's hegemony came to a close,
corporation law scholarship, if not "dead," was certainly viewed as an intellectual
backwater. 68 Cutting-edge scholarship was the province of other fields. The typical
Corporations or Business Associations casebook was filled with many tired, old cases.
69
As the 1970s came to a close, into this stagnant field came the Nexus-of-Contracts
Paradigm and its primarily Chicago-style, microeconomic-trained missionaries. They met
little resistance, but they were not welcomed as liberators.70
IV. THE NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS PARADIGM AND THE ENTREPRENEUR; LAW AND
ECONOMICS MEET AGAIN
Though it is impossible to date precisely, the Nexus-of-Contracts Paradigm achieved
dominance in the field of corporation law near the end of the 1970s. 71 It was modernly
rooted in Jensen and Meckling's 1976 article on the theory of the firm, 72 and Eugene
Fama's 1980 article on the same subject. 73
The foundation upon which Jensen and Meckling built was R.H. Coase's terse
assertion that "[a] firm . . . consists of the system of relationships which comes into
existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur." 74 Expanding
on Coase's insights, Jensen and Meckling emphasized that a "firm" or "corporation" is
not a real individual or entity. Instead, "the firm [is] the nexus of a set of contracting
relationships among individuals . . . -75 Thus, a "firm" is "only a multitude of complex
relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor,
64. Of course, federal law intrudes on corporate governance, and has done so since the enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588, 600-15 (2003).
Clearly there has been more intrusion as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859 (2003);
Roberta S. Carmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas: The Securities and Exchange Commission
Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005).
65. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
66. "[A] federal law of corporations now exists. But it has always existed-since the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933." Arthur Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146,
1179 (1965).
67. E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 144 (1999).
68. See Bayless Manning, Shareholders Appraisal Remedy: Essay on Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245
n.37 (1962).
69. Robert W. Hamilton, The State of State Corporation Law: 1986, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 3 n.16 (1986).
70. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1530, 1530 (1989).
71. Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule,
Corporate Legitimacy, And Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 915 (1996).
72. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
73. Fama, supra note 43.
74. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, NEW SERIEs 386, 394 (1937).
75. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 72, at 310.
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material and capital inputs and the consumers of the output." 76
Following Jensen and Meckling, Eugene Fama completed the Contractarian assault
on the underpinnings of traditional corporate theory, and at the same time, dismissed the
classic entrepreneur from any role in the developing theory of the modem corporation.
[S]eparation of ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form of
economic organization within the "set of contracts" perspective. We first set
aside the typical presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful
sense. The attractive concept of the entrepreneur is also set aside, at least for
the purposes of the large modem corporation. Instead, the two functions usually
attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as
naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm ....
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm.
Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of
contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way
receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In this "nexus of contracts"
perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept.77
The Nexus-of-Contracts Paradigm led a sweeping reconsideration of the nature and
purpose of corporation law, yielding profoundly important insights. However, with the
benefit of 20-20 hindsight, it is possible to identify two serious flaws in the way the
Paradigm was understood and communicated, particularly as it relates to the
interconnection between the study of corporation law and an understanding of the role
played by the classical entrepreneur. 78 As I have examined extensively in a separate
paper, 79 the first error lies in the Nexus-of-Contracts definition itself, which equates the
firm and the corporation. 80 The second flaw, which I will set out in some detail below, is
traceable to the acceptance of Eugene Fama's view 81 that a positive account of the
modem corporation would not benefit from continued study of the classical entrepreneur.
76. Id. at 311.
77. Fama, supra note 43, at 289-90.
78. As transported to law, a typical explication of the nexus-of-contracts paradigm is that of Professor Jon
Macey:
[O]ne should view the corporation as nothing more than a set of contractual arrangements among
various claimants to the product and earnings generated by the business. The group of claimants
includes not only shareholders, but also creditors, employee managers, the local communities in
which the firm operates, suppliers, and, of course, customers. The core insight of the nexus-of-
contracts paradigm is that contract defines each participant's rights, benefits, duties, and
obligations in the corporate endeavor. This insight, in turn, implies that one should not give any
class of claimants preference over any other. Instead, each claimant or a group of claimants
deserves to receive only the exact benefits of the particular bargain that it has struck with the firm,
no more and no less.
Jonathan Macey, Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies From a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266-67 (1999).
79. Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Corporation as Sole-Proprietor Surrogate, Presented at Georgetown-Sloan
Project on Business Institutions Conference on Corporations as Producers and Distributors of Rents 4, 23-28
(Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, available from author on request).
80. Id. at 26.
81. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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Looking many years back, it is now clear that the triumph of the Nexus-of-Contracts
Paradigm was but a part of the re-emergence of economic liberalism and its emphasis on
individualism, private property in the means of production, and free markets, as the
governing ideology not only in American society, but also in large parts of the world.
82
However provident or inevitable that triumph may now seem, it was unexpected at the
time. 83 Thus, the original debate between Contractarians and those defending the older
paradigm focused on whether the corporation should be viewed primarily in contractual
terms as the product of voluntary choices made by individuals, or, at least in part, as a
social organization that must be regulated to protect the interests of both shareholders and
society as a whole. 84 Within the world of corporation law scholarship, there was no post-
Fama consideration of why the Nexus-of-Contracts definition failed to follow Coase in
locating the entrepreneur at the center of the firm.
It is here, I believe, that the governing ideology got off track as a descriptive theory
of corporation law. The initial proponents of the Nexus-of-Contracts theory wanted to,
and to a large extent did, cancel out the Berle-Means thesis and its focus on the
corporation as a social organization. But in their zeal to reestablish individualism and
contractarian analysis, they also threw out the "classical entrepreneur." Just as having a
theoretical understanding of the classic entrepreneur was important to proper
comprehension of mid-to-late-19th century free markets in action, so too does that
understanding have substantial positive, predictive ability for the current era.
Following Coase, the firm should have been conceived as involving two sets of
differently bounded contractual relations. Within one set of relations, which we can
depict as bounded by a circle, are the relations between and among shareholders and
managers. The relations so bounded constitute the corporation, and these relations are the
primary subject of corporation law.85
The corporation, viewed as the sum of these contractual relations between and
among shareholders and managers, is a surrogate for the entrepreneur in the classic sole
proprietorship. To depict the firm, we must draw a larger circle, at the center of which is
the corporation. The firm, viewed in Coasian terms, is the relation between the
corporation (acting as entrepreneur) and the other constituents of the firm. 86
The failure to view the corporation and the firm as involving entirely different sets
of contractual relations has led to inordinate confusion and communication difficulties
82. Just as the Berle and Means Paradigm achieved hegemony not as a free-standing theory, but as a part
of the ideological shift from liberalism to managed capitalism that occurred in this country in the 1930s. See
supra text accompanying notes 2-12.
83. Indeed, many of us who lived through that transformation would agree with Eric Hobsbawm's dismay
and disbelief (even without the advantage of his personal memory of the Great Depression):
Those of us who lived through the years of the Great Slump still find it almost impossible to
understand how the orthodoxies of the pure free market, then so obviously discredited, once again
came to preside over a global period of depression in the late 1980s and 1990s, which, once again,
they were equally unable to understand or deal with.
HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES, supra note 4, at 103.
84. To get the flavor of this debate, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1395 (1989); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
85. See Coase, supra note 74, at 394; O'Kelley, supra note 79, at 23-26.
86. See Coase, supra note 74, at 391; O'Kelley, supra note 79, at 26, 30.
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between Contractarians and Progressives. 87 Progressives have seen the apparent ex ante
equality of shareholders, managers, employees and other constituents of the firm as
supporting their view that corporation law should address the concerns of this larger
group of constituents. 88 Moreover, to some extent Progressives view, or at least describe,
their other constituency arguments as not only normative, but descriptive. 89 Properly
differentiating the firm and the corporation prevents that confusion. So clarified, the
Nexus-of-Contracts definition of the firm directly makes the positive claim that
corporation law applies only to relations between and among shareholders and managers,
because the corporation, by definition, only includes those relations. 90 Put another way,
the corporation (the set of relations between the shareholders and managers) is the
artificial sole proprietor that owns and manages the incorporated firm. 9 1
This definitional clarification leads to, and perhaps partially explains, the second
error in the Nexus-of-Contracts Paradigm. If the corporation is a set of relations that
collectively replace the entrepreneur, then we should be intensely interested in how, if at
all, corporation law is designed to promote, support, or ensure that this surrogate
entrepreneur functions as a reasonable substitute for the entrepreneur in the classic firm.
To understand this, we must understand how the modern corporation, in theory, can be
organized so as to include a person or persons who carry out the functions of the classic
entrepreneur in a manner consistent with the assumptions that underlie traditional free
market ideology.
V. THE CLASSICAL ENTREPRENEUR WITHIN THE MODERN CORPORATION-FRANK
KNIGHT REVISITED
Frank Knight, progenitor of the theory of the classic entrepreneur, 92 disagreed with
the proposition that ownership and control are separated in the modem corporation, a
proposition unchallenged even by Contractarians. 93 As he cryptically noted: "Whenever
we find an apparent separation between control and uncertainty-bearing, examination will
87. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge aptly described:
Contractarians and noncontractarians no longer have much of interest to say to one another;
indeed, they barely speak the same language. To shift metaphors, those who adhere to the nexus
of contracts model pass those who do not like so many ships in the night, with only an occasional
exchange of broadsides to enliven the proceedings.
Steven M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: a Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).
88. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 705, 777 & n.33 (2002).
89. See Peter C. Konstant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 667, 668-70 (2002); Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 19, at_287-89 (1999).
90. O'Kelley, supra note 79, at 29.
91. Id. at 27-28.
92. It may well be that Frank Knight should be viewed as the father of modem Contractarianism: his book
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, supra note 21, anticipates much of what has since been worked out by
theorists in the principal-agent, property rights, and transaction cost economics branches of general economic
theory.
93. Fama, supra note 43, at 289-90.
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show that we are confusing essentially routine activities with real control."'94 Market
forces normally will cause the modem corporation to be organized so that control is
exercised by one or more persons who are effective surrogates for the classical
entrepreneur. To understand why this is so, we must understand the relationship between
entrepreneurship and uncertainty. We must understand why decisions made by non-
owner employees that appear to involve wide discretion, never involve entrepreneurial
risk or control. We must appreciate why the person actually exercising decision-making
authority at the pinnacle of the corporation will usually be motivated to manage in the
best interest of the corporation and its constituents, whether or not she owns a controlling
bloc of the corporation's stock.
Knight's central thesis was that uncertainty is the most critical factor to abstract
from reality to produce perfect competition, and that uncertainty's presence in the real
world explains the existence of the entrepreneur and the firm. 95 "Chief among the
simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition is... the
assumption of practical omniscience on the part of each member of the competitive
system." 96 With perfect knowledge and foresight, producers know not only what
consumers now want, but what they will want in the future. Thus producers know what
they need to do to maximize the value of their productive resources, and how to go about
doing it.9
7
In the world of perfect competition theory, every producer is assumed to have
perfect understanding of her own talents, knowledge, integrity, and leadership ability.
These attributes are treated as unchanging, as are all other features of this hypothetical
world. Needs and wants are known and unchanging. There are no new resources to
exploit, current resources are available without fear of exhaustion; there are never any
scientific resources, inventions, wars or plagues. 98 Through a process of adjustment and
experimentation, each person would determine the highest and best use of her talents and
time. 99 To the extent production were to prove more efficient via coordinated efforts
involving specialization of function, such adjustments would occur through each person
providing to the market that product or service that maximizes his or her utility. 100
Finally, equilibrium would be reached and the economy would work like a clock
thereafter. 1Oi
Therefore, when uncertainty is abstracted away, there is no need for a firm or an
entrepreneur even when division and specialization of labor are present. 102
With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of
perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of
the nature of responsible management or control of productive activity. Even
94. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 298.
95. Id. at 20-21.
96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. at 268.
98. Id. at 266.
99. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 267.
100. Id. at 106-07.
101. Id. at 107-08.
102. Prior to Knight, many leading theorists viewed the firm as a natural by-product of the division of
labor. Id. at 398.
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marketing activities in any realistic sense would not be found. The flow of raw
materials and productive services through productive processes to the consumer
would be entirely automatic .... There might be managers, superintendents,
etc., for the purpose of coordinating the activities of individuals. But under
conditions of perfect knowledge and certainty such functionaries would be
laborers merely, performing a purely routine function, without responsibility of
any sort, on a level with men engaged in mechanical operations. 103
Knight also asserted the converse point: When uncertainty is present, the existence
of the entrepreneur and the firm naturally follows. "With uncertainty absent, man's
energies are devoted altogether to doing things . . . . With uncertainty present, doing
things, the actual execution of activity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life;
the primary function or activity is deciding what to do and how to do it."' 10 4 With
uncertainty present, producers no longer know what consumers want. Instead they must
forecast these wants, which involves predicting the future. Likewise, producers no longer
know how best to organize production. As a result, "the work of forecasting and at the
same time a large part of the technological direction and control of production are still
further concentrated upon a very narrow class of the producers, and we meet with a new
economic functionary, the entrepreneur." 105
Importantly, the entrepreneur is selected in the same competitive process that
determines how other productive resources are allocated; the entrepreneur is a function or
product of the rational, self-interested choices of the entrepreneur and those who choose
whether or not to work for her and whether or not to buy her products. Some individuals
have superior knowledge and skill at estimation of consumer wants, superior ability to
control and direct the actions of others, greater confidence that their business estimates-
business judgments-will prove correct. 10 6 As joint production groups form and
specialize in particular activities, they seek "individuals with the greatest managerial
capacity of the requisite kinds and [place] them in charge of the work of the group,
submitting the activities of other members to their direction and control. ' 107 Likewise,
individuals compete for positions as entrepreneurs or for other positions within the
group. 108 Self-interest causes each individual to select and be selected for the role that
103. Id. at 267. Coase, writing later, misunderstood Knight's insight:
Finally, it seems important to notice that even in the case of an economic system where there is no
uncertainty Professor Knight considers that there would be co-ordinators, though they would
perform only a routine function. He immediately adds that they would be "without responsibility
of any sort," which raises the question by whom are they paid and why?
Coase, supra note 74, at 401.
Apparently Coase thought Knight was using the term "managers, superintendents" synonymously with
the term "entrepreneur." Knight clearly was not, since, for him, entrepreneurs must be "responsible managers."
See KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 259, 267. Properly understood, Knight and Coase had identical views about how
a world without firms would operate. Compare Knight's description, above, with R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm: Influence, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 65 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
104. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 268.
105. Id.
106. Id. at270.
107. Id. at 269.
108. Id. at 273-74.
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maximizes the value of her talents, taking into account her willingness to assume the risk
of the business judgments on which the group's fortunes will depend. 109
In the real world, individuals differ in numerous important ways, including
intelligence, training, leadership ability, integrity, physical strength, endurance, and so
on. In the real world, producing goods and service involves a multitude of interrelated
tasks that differ markedly in the requisite skills and knowledge required for their
accomplishment. Men and women specialize in these tasks, one of which is serving as an
entrepreneur. The classic entrepreneur is someone with both "superior managerial ability
(foresight and capacity of ruling others)" 10 ... and enough confidence in her ability that
she is willing to "'back it up' [and] specialize in risk-taking."''' 1
In larger enterprises, the various components that go into producing and marketing a
product or service, involve innumerable "problems" that must be solved at every level of
the firm. The problem may be no more difficult than to decide how to move a ton of coal
from spot A to spot B, or it may involve writing a security program to protect a firm's
computer system from destructive breaches. To solve each of these problems a certain
amount of knowledge, judgment and skill is required. The solution to each of these
problems involves a certain amount of uncertainty, and determining how to solve each
problem requires someone to exercise judgment. Someone must decide what to do, and
then decide whether to do it herself, or delegate the task to one or more persons under her
control in the firm's hierarchy.
The entrepreneur cannot do all of these tasks herself, nor can she know how best to
solve the problem presented by each sub-task involved in carrying out the business of the
firm. What the successful entrepreneur must do is put the right people in charge of the
right task of management at the level in the hierarchy immediately below her own. These
managers must then assign men and women to solve the sub-tasks that fall within the area
of responsibility delegated to them by the entrepreneur. These men and women may, in
turn, control other men and women further down the hierarchy, and so on. 112
Knight's seminal insight was that uncertainty colors the decision of whether to
become an entrepreneur or an employee. Once a person decides to become an
entrepreneur, uncertainty affects her decision of who to hire (or attempt to hire) and what
to offer as wages. 113 Likewise uncertainty affects the person deciding whether to accept a
particular offer of employment. Each of these decisions involve judgments about men
and women, their skills, knowledge, and integrity-about their ability to perform the task
that they are being asked or are offering to perform. 114
The employee is someone who lacks the confidence, skills, knowledge, or capital to
be an entrepreneur. However, in agreeing to become an employee, she agrees to accept
the entrepreneur's direction and control in return for a promised wage. 115 The
prospective employee must have confidence that the entrepreneur can fulfill the wage
promises made to her, that the entrepreneur's confidence in herself is well-placed, yet she
109. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 269.
110. Id. at 270.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 297.
113. Id. at 269-70.
114. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 291-93.
115. Id. at 270.
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will necessarily be unable to know that the entrepreneur will be successful in the planned
venture. 116 Consequently, she will be unlikely to accept the entrepreneur's offer of
employment unless the entrepreneur will put her own capital at risk to provide a
substantial guarantee that the wages will, in fact, be paid. In other words, the prospective
employee's uncertainty about the entrepreneur's ability to perform is ameliorated by the
entrepreneur's confidence in herself, demonstrated by the equity capital the entrepreneur
puts at risk. Ownership (risk-taking) and control must be united in the entrepreneur, or
the firm will be unable to attract the best possible employees. 117
Given Knight's theory of the criticality of unification of ownership and control in a
classic entrepreneur, how can the modem corporation be viewed as an efficient, socially
useful, economic organization? Knight answers counter to received wisdom: the apparent
separation of ownership and control is usually illusory. 118
The first step necessary to understanding the distribution of control and
responsibility in modem business is to grasp this fact: what we call "control," consists
mainly of selecting someone else to do the "controlling." Business judgment is chiefly
the judgment of men and women. 119
Control is exercised at every level in the firm by a superior choosing whether to
perform a particular task (solve a particular problem) or, instead, to assign part or all of
the task to someone below her in the hierarchy, which itself may require judgment as to
whether to self-perform some or all of the assigned task or pass it down to someone else.
Each decision involves a judgment by the decider about her own abilities and a judgment
about the abilities of those whom she directs. To the extent someone who is being
directed is doing something that is not routine, that is not within their expected
competence, they are expected to appeal to their superior for assistance. Thus, each
person in the hierarchy below the entrepreneur makes only routine judgments, because
the only entrepreneurial judgment is what task to assign and what decisions require
decision by the higher authority. 120 As Knight puts it, "[t]he true uncertainty in organized
life is the uncertainty in the estimate of human capacity, which is always a capacity to
meet uncertainty." 121 Since each person lower in the hierarchy has been judged and told
what tasks to perform and what problems to pass back to a superior for guidance if
encountered, no subordinate is exercising control, because they are doing only the task
they have been assigned. Only the entrepreneur, exercising the ultimate decision about
what to make, how to make it, who to hire as seconds-in-command, and what tasks to
delegate to them, is actually exercising control. 122
The other consideration in locating a classic entrepreneur within the modem
corporation, presumably in the person of the CEO, is how to overcome the view that has
been so long dominant, that almost by definition a CEO cannot be the equivalent of the
classic entrepreneur when her shareholdings constitute far less than a majority of the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 271.
118. Id. at 297.
119. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 291.
120. Id. at 296-99.
121. Id. at 309.
122. Id. at 297.
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voting equity. 123 The long-held assumption is that there is a significant wealth loss
attributable to the agency costs that managers can be expected to impose on the
corporation, including the costs of the optimal amount of bonding or monitoring, and that
those costs increase as the CEO's percentage of company equity declines. The most
significant of the presumed losses flows from the claim made in the principal-agent
literature that "as the manager's ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant
effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls." 124
Focusing on the disincentive effects that principal-agent theory expects when a CEO
owns substantially less than 100% of a company's equity, highlighting the fundamental
way in which entrepreneurs differ from the 'normal' risk-averse actor. The archetypal
entrepreneur is by nature an optimist, a doer, a dreamer-not a carefully, calculating
wealth maximizer. Knight captured this essential point in his concluding explanation of
why separation of ownership and control is illusory: 1
25
Most [shareholders in the modem corporation] do not regard themselves and
are not regarded as owners of the business. In form they are owners, but in
substance they are merely creditors, and both they and the insiders count upon
the fact. The great companies are really owned by small groups of men who
generally know each other's personalities, motives and policies tolerably
well. 126
In other words, Knight, like Berle and Means, claims as an empirical fact that
managers maintain themselves in office, not by virtue of share ownership, but by virtue
of control of friendly boards. However, unlike Berle and Means, Knight firmly believes
that these entrenched managers are motivated to act as real entrepreneurs and in the best
interest of the corporation.
Principal agent theorists, and many conservative or Chicago-style contractarians,
join Berle and Means in assuming that a CEO (manager) will not act as a classic
entrepreneur, but instead will act in a rational and calculating manner in pursuit of his
own self-interest so that "as the manager's ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote
significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures
falls."' 27 Moreover, because his share of ownership is less than 100%, the rational CEO
may "avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his
part to manage or to learn about new technologies." 128
Knight presents a compelling counter account: "The conventional view is, of course,
to regard risk-taking as repugnant and irksome and to treat profit as the 'reward' of
assuming the 'burden' . . ."129; "it appears [however] that risk-taking is the opposite of
123. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 72, at 312-13.
124. Id. at 313.
125. This account anticipates Fama, supra note 43, with regard to the fact that shareholders cannot be
viewed as owners in any meaningful sense, and that the "problem" of separation of ownership and control is not
a "problem" but a naturally occurring and efficient ownership structure. Fama differs from Knight only in
failing to see the value in identifying the CEO as a substitute for the classic entrepreneur.
126. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 359.
127. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 72, at 313.
128. Id.
129. KNIGHT, supra note 21, at 362.
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irksome .... [That is to be doubted];" 130 "[entrepreneurs] are not the critical and hesitant
individuals, but rather those with restless energy, buoyant optimism, and large faith in
things generally and themselves in particular . . ."131; "Most human motives tend on
scrutiny to assimilate themselves to the game spirit. It is little matter, if any, what we
have set ourselves to do .... But once having set ourselves to achieve some goal it
becomes imperative to achieve it." 
132
For it is clear that the 'personal' interests which our rich and powerful business
men work so hard to promote are not personal interests at all .... The real
motive is the desire to excel, to win at a game, the biggest and most fascinating
game yet invented, not excepting even statecraft and war. 133
One's view of human nature determines whether one believes that a CEO with a
relatively small equity stake will be naturally motivated to shirk or naturally motivated to
act as a classic entrepreneur in the corporation's best interest. Trying to further explore
relative merits of either position is far beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, I will
make behavioral assumptions in my concluding comments to illustrate in a very
preliminary and incomplete fashion, how a theory of entrepreneur primacy might
contribute to the evolving positive theory of the modem corporation.
VI. DOES THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEUR PRIMACY CONTRIBUTE TO A DESCRIPTIVE
ACCOUNT OF THE CORPORATION?
Does the theory of entrepreneur primacy add to our descriptive understanding of the
corporation and corporation law? That is a question I plan to address more fully in later
articles. I will conclude this effort with a simple example of how entrepreneur primacy
adds to our knowledge.
For purposes of this example, I will assume that a majority shareholder who serves
as her corporation's CEO constitutes an adequate surrogate for the classic
entrepreneur. 13 4 Thus, I will totally avoid for now grappling with the facially more
difficult proposition that CEOs with relatively small equity stakes will, under appropriate
conditions, operate as satisfactory substitutes or surrogates for the classic entrepreneur.
The proposition I will explore below is this: It is descriptively accurate to view
corporation law as designed to promote or support the ownership and management
prerogatives of a majority-shareholder CEO so that she may be expected to function as
the corporation's classic entrepreneur.
I will compare the predictive power of my model with the predictions that flow from
two versions of director primacy-one advocated by Stephen Bainbridge, the other by
Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair. The case I will use to illustrate why this proposition
130. Id. at 367.
131. Id. at 366.
132. Id. at 53.
133. Id. at 360.
134. Studies of CEO compensation lend support to this assumption; majority-shareholder CEOs receive
significantly less remunerative salary and incentive-based compensation than CEOs with non-controlling
shareholdings. See Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive
Pay, I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 233, 252-54 (2004).
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appears to add value is Adlerstein v. Wertheimer. 135 The case involves a dispute between
Joseph Adlerstein (the CEO, Board Chair, and controlling stockholder of Spectrumedix,
Inc., a Delaware corporation) and the other two members of the company's board of
directors-Stephen Wertheimer and Judy Mencher.
Adlerstein was a scientist and entrepreneur who had been involved in funding and
managing a number of start-up technology companies. In 1992, he founded
SpectruMedix. In 1997, SpectruMedix went public, but it quickly burned through all its
cash. 136 At all relevant times prior to July 1, 2000, Adlerstein held stock providing him
with a majority of the votes in any election of directors. 137
Beginning in January 2000, as the corporation's financial condition deteriorated,
Adlerstein expanded the board of directors of which he had been the sole member, to
three by adding two new directors-Wertheimer, an investment banker and Mencher, a
money manager with expertise in distressed investments. 138 Soon after joining the board,
Wertheimer and Mencher became concerned about Adlerstein's management style. One
employee alleged that Adlerstein had sexually harassed her. 139 On at least one occasion,
Adlerstein lied to the board, claiming that sales were "in the pipeline" which were not. 140
Wertheimer and Mencher decided that they must find funds to keep the company afloat.
The situation reached crisis proportions on July 2, 2002, when a management consultant
hired by the board concluded:
Adlerstein was "the central problem" at the Company, because "he is totally
lacking in managerial and business competence and has demonstrated an
unwillingness to accept these shortcomings." [The consultant] further opined:
"For SpectruMedix to have any chance, [Adlerstein] must be removed from any
operating influence within the company." 141
Wertheimer and Mencher contacted a potential investor, Ilan Reich. Reich agreed to
invest needed funds, but only if the board would issue to him dual-class common stock
with sufficient weighted voting power to make Reich the controlling shareholder.
Wertheimer and Mencher agreed to this demand. 142
Around July 5, 2001, Wertheimer and Mencher orally informed Adlerstein that a
special meeting of the board would be held on July 9, but they did not tell him the
purpose of that meeting.
At the special meeting, while Adlerstein remained silent, Wertheimer and Mencher
approved the transaction with Reich, and issued the new control bloc of stock to him
effective immediately. They then removed Adlerstein as CEO for cause and replaced him
with Reich. After the meeting, Reich, acting by written consent, removed Adlerstein from
the board. 143 Subsequently, Adlerstein filed suit challenging the legitimacy of these
actions.
135. Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. Civ.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002).
136. Id. at *l1-2.
137. Id. at*2.
138. Id. at * 1.
139. Id. at *2.
140. Adlerstein, 2002 WL 205684, at *3.
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id. at *6.
143. Id. at *7.
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The Chancery Court held that Mencher and Wertheimer had breached the
fiduciary duty they owed to Adlerstein, thereby invalidating the actions taken at the July
9, 2000, directors' meeting. I will now evaluate that decision under "Bainbridge-style"
Director Primacy, under "Stout-Blair-style" Director Primacy, and under the
Entrepreneur Primacy theory discussed in this Article.
A. "Bainbridge-Style " Director Primacy
In a series of articles, Steven Bainbridge has developed a coherent and
comprehensive theory of Director Primacy. 144 Simply put, "Bainbridge-style" Director
Primacy places the board of directors at the center of the firm. It is both a normative and
predictive theory: Directors should manage and control the corporation; directors do
manage and control the corporation. 14 5 The only check on the directors' power is an
essentially unenforceable "contractual obligation to maximize the value of the
shareholders' residual claim." 146 If the directors do not hew to this norm, neither the
judiciary nor shareholders have any power to intervene, save in extraordinary
circumstances. 147
Under "Bainbridge-style" Director Primacy, the Delaware Court of Chancery should
have ruled in favor of the actions taken by the majority of the board of directors. Neither
Mencher nor Wertheimer had any material financial interest riding on the decision to oust
Adlerstein and facilitate Reich's assumption of control. Rather, they were acting in the
belief that if they did not do so the corporation would go bankrupt. In such
circumstances, "Bainbridge-style" Director Primacy would describe the directors' use of
their powers as an appropriate attempt to maximize shareholder wealth.
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself [or] to the reduction
of profits .... 148
If Mencher and Wertheimer had acquiesced in Adlerstein's continued management of
SpectruMedix, they would have been acting contrary to their contractual obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth. Put another way, if Mencher and Wertheimer had backed
Adlerstein's continued management of the corporation, they would have been favoring
Adlerstein's personal desire to continue as an officer and director over their own
144. See the following articles by Stephen M. Bainbridge: Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 45 (2002); The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REv. 1 (2002); Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791
(2002); Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (2003);
Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 27-
37 (2003); The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 87-109 (2004).
145. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1, 7-8, 29-32
(2002).
146. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 547, 551 (2003).
147. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 791, 805 (2002).
148. Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 575.
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considered judgment as to the course of action most likely to maximize shareholder
wealth. So doing would violate the norms explicit in "Bainbridge-style" Director
Primacy.
B. "Blair-Stout-style'" Director Primacy
In a series of articles, Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair have developed a different
version of Director Primacy. 149 Like Bainbridge, "Blair-Stout-style" Director Primacy is
both a positive and normative theory. Like Bainbridge, "Blair-Stout-style" Director
Primacy places the board of directors at the center of the firm and blesses the board's
near-total discretion to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 150 However,
under the Blair-Stout theory, the directors do not have a contractual or ethical obligation
to measure their decisions against the norm of shareholder wealth maximization; nor do
they have an obligation to respond to the claims of employees or any other corporate
constituency ahead of the interests of shareholders. 151 Instead, they act as a "mediating
hierarchy," refereeing disputes between shareholders, managers, employees, creditors and
other constituents who are involved in the team production of the corporation's
product. 152 A neutral referee is needed because team production is complex, and the
value of each team member's contribution is difficult to measure and verify. 153
As a mediating hierarchy, the board's goal is to advance the interests of the
corporation as a whole, even if shareholders wealth is diminished. 154 Blair and Stout
assert:
[u]sing team analysis, the "firm" can be understood as a nexus of firm-specific
assets that have been invested by a variety of groups, including most obviously
shareholders, bondholders, managers, and employees. The board of directors
acts as a fiduciary for the firm, meaning that it seeks to maximize the total
value of these combined economic interests. 155
Importantly, Blair and Stout assert that the majority of the board should not be under any
greater obligation to consider the interests of the CEO than the interests of any other
constituency. 156
Under "Blair-Stout-style" Director Primacy, the Delaware Court of Chancery should
have ruled in favor of the actions taken by the majority of the board of directors. Mencher
and Wertheimer are empowered as a majority of the board to take into account and
balance the interests of all corporate constituents. In fact, the board's decision to oust
Adlerstein appears grounded not only in a desire to protect shareholder interest, but also a
149. See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 19; Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory,
supra note 19; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 19.
150. Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 19, at 252; Blair & Stout, Director Accountability,
supra note 19, at 434-35.
151. Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 19, at 254.
152. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 19, at 250-51.
153. Id. at 419.
154. Id. at 436; Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 19, at 271-76.
155. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 19, at 425.
156. Id. at 435 n.93.
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desire to protect creditors and employees.157 Adlerstein is a shoddy manager, he has not
been truthful with the board, and an independent expert has concluded that the firm will
soon be bankrupt unless Adlerstein is deposed. This is clearly a case where the directors,
acting as a neutral mediating hierarchy, would resolve the dispute between Adlerstein and
other corporate constituents-employees, the other shareholders, customers, and
suppliers-in favor of the other corporate constituents.
C. Entrepreneur Primacy
While both versions of Director Primacy point to a decision in favor of the
SpectruMedix board, Entrepreneur Primacy points to a decision protecting Adlerstein's
right to control the corporation. The essence of classic entrepreneurship is direction and
control by the entrepreneur, backed up by the entrepreneur committing his equity as
security for the claims of employees and other corporate constituents. 158 If corporation
law is to support the contractual view of the corporation, and support the majority-
shareholder-CEO's private right to control the corporation and its means of production,
then the court must not interfere, or allow corporate fiduciaries to interfere, with the
entrepreneur's management decisions, even if a majority of the board strongly believes
that the majority-shareholder-CEO's decision or, in this case, continued management of
the firm, is not in the corporation's best interests. Under Entrepreneur Primacy,
ownership and control must be united, or Berle's and Means' fears about the modem
corporation will be realized. 159 Allowing the board to take control away from the
majority-shareholder-CEO, even in dire circumstances, would mean that ultimate control
resided in the board, rather than the entrepreneur.
Interestingly, Stephen Bainbridge concedes the following regarding his version of
Director Primacy:
Director primacy works less well for those firms for which the default rules of
corporate law are often a poor fit. In closely held corporations, for example,
ownership of the equity claim and de facto control of the enterprise typically
are joined. Shareholders of such firms commonly opt out of those default
corporate law rules that effect director primacy. Similarly, director primacy
does not work well with respect to wholly-owned subsidiaries or publicly held
corporations with controlling shareholders. Again, in both settings, ownership
of the equity claim and de facto control tend to be united. 160
In other words, Bainbridge essentially concedes that his theory is non-predictive in the
very circumstance where share ownership and control are united in an effective
entrepreneur. 161
In contrast, Entrepreneur Primacy does predict the result in Adlerstein and does
157. Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. Civ.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
160. Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 33-34.
161. Professor John Coates has asserted that Blair and Stout's version of director primacy is also non-
predictive where a controlling shareholder serves as CEO. John C. Coates IV, Measuring The Domain Of
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 838-40 (1999).
Blair & Stout seem to agree. See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 19, at 447.
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support the limited proposition that this Article addresses: it is descriptively accurate to
view corporation law as designed to promote or support the ownership and management
prerogatives of a majority-shareholder CEO so that she may be expected to function as
the corporation's classic entrepreneur.
Finally, Entrepreneur Primacy explains the very limited reach of Adlerstein and
similar cases. Vice Chancellor Lamb is not asserting that a board must always give the
CEO notice of the purpose of a directors' meeting called for the purpose of removing the
CEO from office:
Here, the decision to keep Adlerstein in the dark about the plan to introduce the
Reich proposal was significant because Adlerstein possessed the contractual
power to prevent the issuance of the Series C Preferred Stock by executing a
written consent removing one or both of Wertheimer and Mencher from the
board. He may or may not have exercised this power had he been told about the
plan in advance. But he was fully entitled to the opportunity to do so and the
machinations of those individuals who deprived him of this opportunity were
unfair and cannot be countenanced by this court. 162
.... The outcome in this case flows from the fact th[at] Adlerstein was both a
director and a controlling stockholder, not from either status individually ....
[T]here is no authority to support the argument that Adlerstein's stockholder
status entitled him to advance notice of actions proposed to be taken at a
meeting of the board of directors. 163
This analysis suggests that not only does Entrepreneur Primacy predict the result in
Adlerstein, but that Vice Chancellor Lamb consciously decided the case with a similar
principle in mind.
VII. CONCLUSION
One example does not a theory make, and much work must be done to test the
predictive power of a theory of Entrepreneur Primacy. To that end, I plan in subsequent
articles to flesh out this theory. What I hope to show is that many troubling features of
corporation law are better explained by my theory than by other accounts of the
corporation. I do not expect, nor do scholars who have developed other theories claim as
to their theories, that my theory will predict every facet of corporation law better than any
other theory. It will be enough if it predicts important aspects of corporation law, such as
the business judgment rule, better than other models.
Thus, I will next attempt to test a much broader proposition than tested in Part VI,
supra. The proposition to be tested is this: corporation law may be understood as a
mechanism to support private ordering intended to provide the modem corporation with a
surrogate for the classic entrepreneur, even if the CEO owns only a small percentage of
the corporation's voting stock. In other words, I will attempt to show that Knight was
right and Berle and Means were wrong in their analysis of separation of ownership and
control in the modem corporation.
162. Adlerstein, 2002 WL 205684, at *9.
163. Id. at n.28 (emphasis added).
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